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Abstract 
Phishing is an especially challenging cyber security threat as it does not attack computer 
systems, but targets the user who works on that system by relying on the vulnerability of their 
decision-making ability. Phishing attacks can be used to gather sensitive information from 
victims and can have devastating impact if they are successful in deceiving the user. Several 
anti-phishing tools have been designed and implemented but they have been unable to solve 
the problem adequately. This failure is often due to security experts overlooking the human 
element and ignoring their fallibility in making trust decisions online. In this paper, we present 
Phish Phinder, a serious game designed to enhance the user’s confidence in mitigating 
phishing attacks by providing them with both conceptual and procedural knowledge about 
phishing. The user is trained through a series of gamified challenges, designed to educate them 
about important phishing related concepts, through an interactive user interface. Key elements 
of the game interface were identified through an empirical study with the aim of enhancing 
user interaction with the game. We also adopted several persuasive design principles while 
designing Phish Phinder to enhance phishing avoidance behaviour among users.  
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1. Introduction 
In March 2016, John Podesta, the chairman of the Hillary Clinton’s presidential 
campaign, received an email which claimed that “someone had his Google 
password” (Fig. 1). The email provided various details about the login attempt and 
went on to reassure him that Google had stopped the attempt. It also contained a link 
luring him to change his password immediately (Fig. 1). It was later discovered that 
this email was sent by a Russian hacking group that targeted Podesta. The attackers 
used bit.ly, a web address shortening service (Bitly, 2017), to mask the full URL in 
the browser. Unfortunately for Podesta, he was deceived into believing that the email 
was legitimate thereby disclosing his credentials by clicking the malicious link, and 
causing the leak of Clinton’s presidential campaign emails (Krawchenko, 2016). This 
incident illustrates that humans are susceptible to making poor trust decisions online 
(Dhamija et al, 2006) and are therefore targeted for phishing attacks which can be 
extremely damaging (Arachchilage et al, 2016).  
Phishing is an especially challenging cyber security problem as it synthesizes social 
engineering techniques with technical subterfuge to make the attack successful 
(Gupta et al, 2017). It has been widely acknowledged as being an important cyber 
security  
 
Fig. 1. The John Podesta emails released by WikiLeaks (Krawchenko, 2016) 
challenge and there are tools, which have been developed with the aim of preventing 
it (Sheng et al, 2007; Fette et al, 2007). However, it has been found that these tools 
are insufficient as they are unable to detect all phishing attacks (Sheng et al, 2007). 
Moreover, such tools are often designed to warn human users about possible 
phishing attacks but it is often left to their decision-making capabilities as to whether 
to download the attachment or click on the link in the email. After all, in most 
systems, it is impossible to completely circumvent human users (Arachchilage and 
Love, 2013). In such a scenario, it is imperative to explore methods to educate users 
and equip them with skills to mitigate such threats effectively. This has led to the 
shift towards phishing awareness mechanisms which are aimed to train the user to 
mitigate phishing attacks (Sheng et al, 2007; Arachchilage and Love, 2013; 
Arachchilage et al, 2016). A challenging problem, however, has been the difficulty 
that humans have in making effective and accurate trust decisions when dealing with 
phishing attacks (Kumaraguru et al, 2008; Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; Arachchilage 
and Love, 2014). A key aspect, which is not addressed in many previous phishing 
awareness mechanisms, is the user’s self-confidence in dealing with phishing attacks 
(Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012). It has been found in previous studies that users make 
better decisions when they are confident about their skills and capability of dealing 
with the situation (mitigating phishing attacks in this case) (Plant, 1994). Therefore, 
in this paper, we present Phish Phinder, which is a gamified approach to enhance 
phishing awareness and avoidance behaviour among users, with the following 
objectives:  
a) Integrate self-efficacy into a gamified design for phishing awareness  
b) Enhance user interaction and promote phishing threat avoidance behaviour 
through a series of gamified challenges.  
Phish Phinder aims to enhance user confidence in dealing with phishing attacks by 
providing them with conceptual and procedural knowledge through an interactive 
user interface. We designed Phish Phinder by adopting a theoretical model 
underpinning the design and eliciting key interface components by conducting a 
focus group. We also incorporated several persuasive design principles in Phish 
Phinder to enhance phishing avoidance behaviour among users.  
2. Background and Related Work 
Automated tools have largely failed to mitigate phishing attacks and even the best 
anti-phishing tools have been found to miss over 20% of phishing websites (Dhamija 
et al, 2006; Sheng et al, 2007; Zhang et al, 2007). This failure is compounded by the 
fact that most systems rely on humans to make sensitive trust decisions during their 
online activities (Arachchilage et al, 2016). This realization has resulted in a shift 
towards phishing awareness mechanisms (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; Arachchilage 
and Love, 2014) including gamified approaches (Sheng et al, 2007; Cone et al, 2007) 
to try and educate users and enhance their threat avoidance behaviour (Foreman, 
2004). There are, however, some shortcomings of current gamified approaches 
which educate users about cyber security challenges. In line with Herley (2009), 
Kirlappos and Sasse (2012) argue that current security education offers little 
protection to end users, due to a failure to provide knowledge through an interactive 
medium rather than an instructional one (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012). Furthermore, 
cyber security education needs to prioritize enhancing users’ self-confidence in 
dealing with threats as humans often make better decisions when they are confident 
in their ability (Plant, 1994).  
Phish Phinder addresses these gaps by integrating self-efficacy into a gamified 
design which is presented to the user through an interactive interface. In the rest of 
this paper, we discuss the methodology followed to design Phish Phinder and 
demonstrate an example scenario to illustrate the different user interactions and 
features of the game. 
 
3. Game Design Methodology 
The design of Phish Phinder is based on components derived from a theoretical 
model wrapped up in a story which simplifies the conceptual and procedural 
knowledge presented to the user by employing persuasive design principles through 
an interactive interface. It familiarizes players with important concepts related to 
phishing attacks through challenges presented to them during the game. The 
challenges in Phish Phinder correspond to the following phishing related concepts, as 
summarized in previous literature (Fette et al, 2007; Zhang et al, 2007): 
1. Malicious URLs: Phishing sites often have URLs which can be spotted and 
identified as malicious if the user is trained to identify what to look for. 
Such URLs may contain IP addresses, for example, which should flag the 
player’s suspicion. 
2. Lookalike domain: Phishing attacks often contain URLs or email addresses 
where some characters are changed to deceive the user. For example, an ‘o’ 
may be changed to a ‘0’ and hence an unsuspecting user may be redirected 
to a malicious site, e.g., www.g0ogle.com.  
3. Subject line of emails: A suspicious subject line would contain numerous 
punctuation marks to attract immediate attention and convey a sense of 
urgency. They may ask for private details such as password, as in the earlier 
discussed case with John Podesta, or bank account number claiming the 
sender to be their bank or their manager at work. The objective would be to 
train users not to divulge such information by replying to such emails.   
 
Fig. 2. Theoretical model used to design Phish Phinder (Arachchilage and 
Love, 2013) 
 
4. Display name spoofing: A common technique used in phishing attacks is 
that the attacker pretends to be a known individual to the target, e.g., a 
system administrator, by showing a known name as the sender but using a 
different email address. The user often does not check the email address of 
the sender and just responds based on the familiar display name.  
5. Reply-to spoofing: Phishing attacks often exploit the fact that users do not 
check the “reply-to” email address and simply click “reply” and their email 
is directed to a different email address accessible to the attacker.  
6. HTML in body of email: The player would be expected to identify any 
emails which contain HTML in the body as malicious. While HTML emails 
have their purpose, the objective of this exercise is to make users aware that 
such emails can often be malicious and therefore enhance their threat 
perception about such scenarios.  
3.1. Theoretical Model 
Phish Phinder aims to enhance users’ self-confidence in dealing with phishing 
attacks. This is essential as users are known to make better trust decisions when they 
are confident in their knowledge and ability to mitigate a threat (Plant, 1994). 
According to the findings of Arachchilage and Love (2013), computer users’ self-
efficacy can be enhanced by providing them with both conceptual as well as 
procedural knowledge. Earlier, McCormick (1997) had also noted that it is essential 
to provide the user with procedural as well as conceptual knowledge to educate them 
about a problem adequately. Keeping these observations in mind, Phish Phinder is 
designed to provide both conceptual as well as procedural knowledge about phishing 
attacks to users to enhance their self-confidence in dealing with such threats. 
Enhanced self-efficacy will lead to increased avoidance motivation and ultimately 
enhance phishing avoidance behaviour among users (Arachchilage and Love, 2013). 
This goal is achieved by Phish Phinder by deriving elements from a theoretical 
model described by Arachchilage and Love (2013) (shown in Fig. 2).  
In Phish Phinder, the conceptual knowledge is provided to users by explaining why a 
URL (or email) represents a phishing attack. This conceptual knowledge will be 
useful for them to identify phishing attacks in the subsequent challenges during the 
game and applying these previously learned concepts would enhance their procedural 
knowledge as well. In this way, self-efficacy is integrated into the design of Phish 
Phinder by employing this theoretical model and wrapping it in a story developed 
using key persuasive design principles. This story is presented to users through a 
user-centered interface designed after conducting an empirical investigation through 
a focus group (described in Section 3.3). This was done to maximize the user 
interaction with the game as attracting their attention to the problem is an essential 
first step of any cyber security awareness mechanism (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012). 
The scope of the empirical investigation was limited to identification of key elements 
of the user interface as the knowledge representation in Phish Phinder is based on the 
theoretical model (Fig. 2) and needed to be preserved and communicated to the user 
through the story. 
3.2. The Story 
The most important component of Phish Phinder is the story through which the 
phishing related concepts are presented to the user. We employed several persuasive 
design principles in Phish Phinder with the aim of enhancing phishing avoidance 
behaviour (Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa, 2009). The story of Phish Phinder is 
similar to the one used in “Anti-phishing Phil” (Sheng et al, 2007). We adopted 
similar characters, which include Johnny, a small fish in a pond and the character 
essayed by the player. The pond is also inhabited by a big fish, Shifu, a more 
experienced and knowledgeable fish, and randomly generated worms, each of which 
represents a URL or an email. Phish Phinder is, however, different to “Anti-phishing 
Phil” (Sheng et al, 2007) as it integrates self-efficacy in the game design to enhance 
phishing avoidance motivation and behaviour among users.  
Johnny’s objective is to eat worms to become a big fish (like Shifu) but he should be 
careful and avoid eating bad worms. Each worm is randomly generated during the 
game and is associated with either a URL or an email which is shown to the player. 
Thus, the player is provided with several classification challenges, identifying 
whether a worm represents a phishing URL (or email) or a legitimate one, which is 
the “primary task support” of this game, in accordance with persuasive design 
requirements (Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa, 2009). The player gets 100 points for 
a correct classification (eating a good worm or avoiding a malicious worm). If the 
player makes an erroneous classification, he/she loses one of the 5 lives available at 
each level of the game.  
Phish Phinder is structured in several levels and the narrative builds up as a metaphor 
of Johnny’s life. He eats worms and keeps learning more about phishing to progress 
through the levels with the aim of eventually becoming as big and knowledgeable as 
Shifu. Such visible targets are an effective way to motivate players during gameplay 
(Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa, 2009). The levels are also designed to motivate the 
player to learn concepts with an increasing level of complexity (e.g. combining 
different types of phishing concepts into one worm in higher levels of the game). The 
player has a limited amount of time to complete all challenges in each level (e.g. 10 
minutes for level 1) and move to the higher level. The repetition of conceptual 
examination (through each randomly selected worm) combined with a learning 
curve, offered by the increasing levels of difficulty, enhances the procedural 
knowledge of the player and enables them to apply the knowledge they have gained 
during the game. In this way, adding to the users’ conceptual knowledge (through 
each challenge) as well as their procedural knowledge (through increasing levels and 
repetition of conceptual examination) would positively impact their self-efficacy to 
mitigate phishing attacks (Arachchilage and Love, 2013). 
If the player is unsure whether a worm is malicious or not, he/she can ask Shifu for 
guidance. Shifu will then advise about the phishing related concept specific to that 
worm. The advice provided by Shifu is shown to the player in messages such as, “a 
company name followed by a hyphen in a URL is generally a scam” or “website 
addresses associated with numbers in the front are generally scams” or “your bank 
will not send an email to ask you about your account number”, which were crafted 
by security experts and phrased in a simple and easy-to-comprehend manner. 
Whenever the player solicits Shifu’s help, 60 seconds would be taken off the game 
clock as a safeguarding cost. Shifu’s guidance (when the player is confused) and 
encouragement (when the player makes a right decision) during gameplay are 
essential for dialogue support which is an important component of persuasive 
systems (Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa, 2009). 
3.3. Focus Group: Eliciting Key Components of the Interface Design 
With the aim of creating a user-centered and interactive interface for Phish Phinder, 
we conducted a focus group to identify key components which needed to be 
addressed while designing the user interface. The aim of conducting this empirical 
investigation was to ensure that we included the users’ preferences during the design 
process to maximize user interaction with the game. After all, users will only learn 
about phishing concepts through the game if they are able to enjoy playing it and 
maximizing interaction is essential to enhance awareness (Kirlappos and Sasse, 
2012).  
We invited 6 individuals from our university (4 postgraduate students and 2 
academics), between the ages of 26 and 34, to share their opinions about how the 
game should be designed. All the participants had been using smartphones for at 
least 4 years. The participants were given a description of the story before arriving 
for the discussion. They were encouraged to voice their opinion about how they 
visualized the design and flow of the game. The moderator asked specific questions 
about the look and feel of the game to elicit ideas for representing the characters of 
the game as well as the training provided to the players. After interacting with the 
participants during the focus group, we identified the following key components that 
needed to be incorporated into the game design: 
 
1. Narrative – The participants were unanimous in their opinion that the game, 
while being educational and aiming to spread awareness of phishing, should 
have an evolving story which would keep the player engaged. One 
participant, for example, said “I only play games which take me somewhere. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Various components of Phish Phinder represented through the user 
interface 
I don’t like to play games which do not evolve with time.” Another 
participant mentioned that he “would not waste time in a game if the 
landscape didn’t change” referring to the desired evolution of the narrative 
of the game.  
2. Rewards - The game should incorporate a rewards mechanism to incentivise 
players and keep their engagement levels high by rewarding them for their 
performance in the game. This has also been established in previous 
evaluations of gamified approaches (Michallef and Arachchilage, 2017). 
One participant in our focus group mentioned an instance when he “did not 
mind paying money to purchase in-game rewards to speed up the 
progress”. In Phish Phinder, rewards would only be available by 
completing levels and learning about phishing related concepts. 
3. Progress Check – The player should be able view their progress and look 
back at the training they have received. Moreover, the participants opined 
that the progress of the player should be contextualized in relation to the 
remaining game challenges to convince them that successfully completing 
the game (and thus completing the training) is an achievable target. This can 
be done relative to the storyline of the game and “showing the main 
character’s journey would be important” according to the participants.  
4. Seamless Interaction – The participants felt that all communication with 
the player should happen within the gaming environment and should look 
like “a part of the scenery”. The participants suggested that the player 
should not feel he is navigating away from the game when feedback is 
provided or when he is making a classification decision (eat/avoid).  
The user interface of Phish Phinder, incorporating all the elements identified through 
the empirical investigation, is shown in Fig 3. The player can “swipe left” to avoid a 
worm if he/she thinks it represents a malicious URL/email or “swipe right” to make 
Johnny eat it if he/she thinks it represents a legitimate URL/email. The player can 
receive rewards in the form of medals (shown in Fig. 3) on completing bonus 
challenges. When such a bonus worm (having a different colour) comes along, the 
player will have a limited amount of time (e.g. 30 seconds), depending on the level 
of the game, to make the decision whether to eat it or not. These challenges are 
intended to test whether the players can apply learnt concepts under time pressure. 
Moreover,  
                              
                        (a)                        (b)                        (c) 
Fig. 4. Response corresponding to a situation where the player (a) Avoided the 
worm, (b) Ate the worm, (c) Asked Shifu for help 
such bonuses and rewards are known to motivate players to remain engaged with 
games (Fogg, 2002; Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa, 2009). 
4. Phish Phinder – User Interaction 
To better illustrate the user interaction in Phish Phinder, let us consider the example 
scenario shown in Fig. 3. The URL shown to the player in Fig. 3, 
“www.paypa1.com” is malicious as the letter “l” in “paypal” has been changed to the 
number “1”. It falls under “malicious URLs” in the types of challenges mentioned in 
Section 3. The scenarios corresponding to the three possible actions are (shown in 
Fig. 4): 
a) Avoid the worm by swiping left if he thinks that the URL is malicious. 
This is the right decision and Shifu will congratulate him and ask him 
to specify what led him to this conclusion, hence testing the player’s 
conceptual knowledge as it is important that the player not only 
identifies phishing attacks but also learns how to do so (Fig. 4a). 
b) Eat the worm by swiping right if he thinks that the URL is legitimate. 
This is the wrong choice and Shifu provides him with feedback 
regarding why he was wrong and which part of the URL represented a 
phishing attack (the ‘l’ in “paypal” has been changed to a ‘1’). The 
player will also lose a life in this case as shown in Fig. 4b.  
c) Ask Shifu for help if he is unsure about the URL who will provide with 
feedback about the particular URL and the nature of the phishing attack 
(Fig. 4c). 60 seconds are taken off the game clock as a safeguarding 
cost. 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
This paper focuses on designing an innovative gamified approach that aims to 
educate users about phishing related concepts and enhance their avoidance 
behaviour. We presented Phish Phinder, which relies on elements derived from a 
theoretical model (Arachchilage and Love, 2013) to integrate self-efficacy into a 
gamified approach to educate users about phishing threats. It has an interactive user 
interface designed by identifying key components through an empirical investigation 
and incorporating persuasive design principles to enhance phishing avoidance 
behaviour.   
In future work, we intend to implement Phish Phinder as a mobile application to be 
used by real users. A detailed analysis of the current spectrum of phishing attacks, 
outlining how they have evolved, will be conducted to ensure relevant and timely 
education and awareness is provided through Phish Phinder. We plan to conduct user 
studies to empirically investigate how the knowledge (the interaction effect of both 
conceptual and procedural) conveyed through the game impacts the users’ self-
efficacy and ultimately enhances their phishing threat avoidance behaviour. We will 
also explore the memorability of phishing related concepts provided through Phish 
Phinder by conducting longitudinal studies with users. Such empirical evaluation 
will inform us about the usability and effectiveness of Phish Phinder.  
Finally, we believe that the design principles described in this paper can be adapted 
to tackle other important cyber security challenges, such as online authentication, 
password management and data privacy. This has the potential to enhance avoidance 
behaviour among users and promote good practices relevant to these threats.  
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